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ALUMNI NOTES.
W. Alfred Valentine, '01, passed a creditable examination in Luzerne county, and
has been admitted to practice in its several
courts. He is associated in practice with
L. Floyd Hess, '01.
Lorrie R. Holcomb, '01, has been admitted to practice'in Luzerne county.
Howard M. Harpel, '01, was recently
admitted to the bar of Northumberland
county.

John Kemp, '01, ha.4 been admitted to
practicein Luzerne county.
D. L. Fickes, '95; J. F. Gilroy, '96, and
W. W. Merkel, '00, were holiday visitors
in town.
Howard L. Henderson, 101, is now located at 1454 Logan avenue, Tyrone, Pa.
Robert Smith, '00, and J. Edward Long,
'99, were recent visitors in Carlisle.

Ralph D. Nicholls, '01, was admitted to
the Philadelphia Bar, one day last week,
after a successful examination. He is in
the office of Matthew Verner Simpson,
Esq., Crozer Building, 1420 Chestnut St.,
Philadelphia.
SCHOOL NOTES.
Attorney-General Elkin has signified
his willingness to serve as Commencement Day orator.
In the recent examination in Luzerne
county, for admission to practice in its
several courts, a clas's of nineteen presented themselves. Nine were successful.
Among the successful ones are numbered
three graduates of the Dickinson School of
Law. In fact, none of our graduates
failed while several from other institutions
were not so fortunate.
The Law Student's Helper, in the
December issue, contains the following
recognition of the work of our literary
societies. "The Allison Society and the
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Dickinson Law Society, the two student
organizations at the Dickinson Law
School, have gotten to work promptly.
These societies have always been so conducted that membership therein has been
one of the most important features of the
work at that excellent school. Societies
where the work is conducted as it is in
the Dickinson and Allison Societies, will
always prove of great benefit to students,
and we are surprised that their example
has not been more generally followed by
the students at other schools throughout
the country."
Lonergan and Melutire, both of the
Senior class, have been unable to return as
yet owing to severe illness. It is the
earnest hope of all the students that they
may soon be with us again.
The announcement that Mr. Yocum, of
the Junior class, who was stricken with a
severe illness on the day ofhisreturn from
vacation and who has since undergone a
serious operation at Todd Hospital, is
rapidly improving, will be gratifying to
the entire student body.
A plan is under consideration for the
organization of an "Historical Society" in
connection with the Law School. Such
organizations have been effected at the
two lawschools in Philadelphia. Theone
to be organized here will be the third organization of this kind known to be in
existence. Fuller particulars will appear later.
PRIZES.
THE WILLIAT6 C. ALLISON PRIZE.-This
prize is offered by William C. Allison,
LL. B.; of the Philadelphia Bar, for excellence in some work assigned by the
Dean to members of the Senior class. The
subject assigned for the present year is,
"The Modification of Writing by Parol."

THE DEAN'S PRIzEs.-A prize is offered
to the student of the Middle class who
shall produce the best briefs in the causes
heard in the moot courts during the January-June Term, a prize of twenty-five dollars.
A prize of twenty-five dollars is also offered to the member of the Junior class
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who shall present the best examination
paper in "Real Property" at the end of
the year.
THE WILLIAM

D. BOYER PRIZES. --

William D. Boyer, A. M., LL. B., an
alumnus of the school and a member of
the Lackawanna County Bar, has generously offered four prizes of twenty-five
dollars each, for excellence in work to be
indicated by the Dean.
Prize No. 1 is offered to the member of
the Middle class who shall do the best
work in the law of Evidence.
Prize No. 2 is offered to the member of
the Middle class who shall prepare thebest
essay on an assigned topic. The topic assigned for this year is The Action of Replevin in Pennsylvania.
For the third and fourth prizes, -the
competitors must be members of one of the
three athletic teams-football, baseball, or
track.
Prize No. 3 is awarded to the competitor, having this qualification, who shall
excel In an examination in the "Law of
Torts."
Prize No. 4 is awarded to the writer of
the best thesis on some topic in "Criminal
Law." The subject assigned for this year
is, "The right of officer and unofficial person to arrest without warrant."
At least two contestants must enter for
each prize. Names of competitors must
be entered with the Deanon or before February 12.
ALLISON SOCIETY.
Comparatively uninteresting programs
were rendered by the Allison Society during the past month. On some evenings,
some members selected to participate in
the program appeared unprepared, and
others failed to appear at all or to send
messages explaining why they were absent. This inactivity is unusual in the
Allison, and was probably due to the proximity of the Christmas vacation. With
thoughts of three weeks at their respective homes, thoughts of the annual Christmas examinations and a desire to pass
that work satisfactorily, the members
had but little time to devote to the
Allison. Now, however, it is expected
that the energetic line of work that
characterized the society during the fore
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part of last term will be resumed again.
The Executive Committee, anticipating
this, has given out the first of the seriesof
programs that it has had under consideration for sometime. This program will be
conducted next Friday evening and will
consist of the organization of the House of
Representatives. It is probable that
several meetings will be required to complete the program that has been published. At the meeting Friday evening,
an organization will be effected, and
several bills will be introduced, and referred to the proper committees. This
work will consume the entire time of the
meeting, and the meeting following will
be devoted to debates on these bills.
Several members who have a thirst for
debates of this character have prepared
speeches, and judging from the research
that some of these men are making, and
the reputation they have for eloquence
the speeches will be as fit for publication
in the Congressional Record as some that
grace the pages of that august journal. '
Other innovations in the way of entertainment will be given out by the Execution Committee before its term of office
expires.
DICKINSON SOCIETY.
The last regular meeting night of last
term, Friday, Dec. 13th, was mainly
taken up by an important business meeting. Election of officers was the most important matter transacted. The following
officers were elected: President, Gross;
Vice President, Ebbert; Secretary, Myers;
Treasurer, fMorehouse. After the completion of the business, an interesting program was rendered-the feature of which
was the debate, Resolved, "That labor
should be organized." The excellent drill
which the members are receiving in parliamentary practice, isinteresting to note.
The need of wide experience in this line
cannot be emphasized too greatly.
The meeting of the society, held on Friday evening, Jan. 10th, was well attended
and very interesting. President-elect
Gross took the oath of office, and opened
his administration with a brief but
pointed address. The interest taken by
the many members present speaks well
for this term's society work. The program
rendered was lengthy and interesting.

Mr. Matthews exhibited much talent as a
reciter. The debate, "Resolved, That the
United States should build, own, and conwas very
trol the 'Nicaraguan Canal,'
ably handled. Debating has become a
permanent feature of the society's work,
and it is to be hoped that the present interest manifested in society, will be productive ofrepewed efforts in this direction.
THE DELTA CHI.
During the holiday vacation, the Chapter rooms have been refurnished, making
them more comfortable, inviting and
beautiful. New carpets, new lace curtains,
new pictures, contribute to the general improvement in the appearance of the suite.
In one corner of the pretty parlor, a large
corner seat has been erected. It is draped
neatly, nicely upholstered and generously
pillowed, having the richness of an oriental divan about it. The pool room has
been refitted and adorned. Most admirable taste is reflected in the refurnishings
and Messrs. Boryer and Crary, who remained to supervise the work, have received many compliments from the boys.
The chapter begins the new year propitiously.
BOOK REVIEWS.
THE BRIEF ON THE FACTS. Second votume of the "Abbott Trial Brief' series.
By Austin Abbott. Second and enlarged
edition. The Lawyer's Co-operative Publishing Co., _ochester, N. Y. 1901. Price,
$4.50 delivered.
The generalexcellence of the first edition
of this valuable publication, in itself commends the second and enlarged edition
and precludes the necessity of an extended
discussion of its merits. Much of the valuable time of the practitioner necessarily
spent in. endeavoring to anticipate the
collateral questions which may arise, will
be saved by its use. Its utility as a conservator of time can scarcely be over estimated. The work has been carefully done,
is conveniently arranged, and carefully
indexed. It should be in the hands of
every practitioner.
Acknowledged.-Review will follow.
"Pennsylvania Law of Conveyancing."
By Christopher Fallon, of the Philadelphia Bar, Philadelphia. T. & J. TV.
Johnson & Co., 1902, pp. xix, 909.
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The following is a continuation of the
Moot Court cases :
No. 52. Berkhouse,
Cisney,
Hindman,
James.
Phillips, J.
No. 53. Bradshaw,
Brundage,
Brennan,
Cooper.
Delaney, Leroy, J.
No. 54. Chapman,
Carlin,
Core,
Keelor.
Longbottom, J.
No. 55. Cook,
Fleitz,
Crary,
Delaney, Ed.
Mays, J.
No. 56. Hubler,
Jacobs, J. W.,
Ebbert,
Schanz.
Sherbine, J.
No. 57. Lanard,
Lloyd,
Myers,
Fox.
Yeagley, J.
No. 58. Lourimer,
Matthews,
Cannon,
Dever.
Miller, J.
No. 59. Gerber,
Bouton,
Iorehouse,
Prickett.
Cannon, J.
No. 60. Mowry,
Walsh,
Shiffer,
Shomo.
Core, J.
No. 61. Willer,
Wilcox,
Delaney, Leroy, Jones.
Kaufman, J.
No. 62. Turner,
Sterrett,
McIntyre,
Brock.
Boryer, J.
No. 63. Adamson,
Elmes,
Lonergan,
Rhodes, F.
Brooks, T.
No. 64. Davis,
Houser,
Rhodes, J.,
Thorne.
Elmes, J.
No. 65. Conry,
Laubenstein,
MacConnell,
Points.
Minnich, J.
No. 66. Phillips,
Watson,
Wingert,
Willis.
Hamblen, J.
No. 67. Knappenberger, Hickernell,
Mays,
Peightel.
Gross, J.
No. 68. Hamblen,
Bishop,
Welsh,
Vastine.
Myers, J.
No. 69. Schnee,
Sherbine,
A lbertson,
Chapman.
Rhodes, J., J.

No. 70. Kaufman,
Miller,
Benjamin,
Fleitz.
Thorne, J.
No. 71. Williamson,
Wright,
Gross,
Houser, J.
No. 72. McKeehan,
Moon,
Brooks,
Osborne.
Davis, J.
No. 73. Wilson,
Hugus,
Yeagley,
Wanner.
Conry, J.
No. 74. Cisney,
Jacobs, J. H.,
White,
Carlin.
Moon, J.

MOOT COURT.
HATEL vs. MOSER.
Scirefacias-Mechanic'slien-Agreement
not to file, (a) By contractor; (b) By subcontractor-Actof June 26, 1895.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Moser, owning a lot, contracted with
John Schell for the erection thereon of a
house, Schell agreeing not to file any lien
and to protect the property from the filing
of any. The contract was never recorded,
nor a copy of it filed. Schell sub-contracted
with Hatel, to do the brick work, and
Hatel agreed in this sub-contract not to
file any lien. Moser was not a party to
this sub-contract. Hatel filed, neverthe.
less, a lien for $724.
Fox and ScHNEE for the plaintiff.
To prevent the filing of a lien, the contract against so doing must be recorded.
Act of June 26, 1895 ; Shannon v. Home,
16 Sup. 250.
The act not being complied with, the
contract between the defendant and the
contractor cannot operate so as to bind the
sub-contractor, therefore, the said cOntract
constitutes no defense to the scifa. Stevenson Company v. Guenther, 190 Pa. 628;
Lumber Company v. Gill, 187 Pa. 24.
MowRY and PHILLIPS for the defendant.
A sub-contractor cannot file alien where,
in his contract with the principal contractor, he agrees not to file liens. Stoneback v. Waters, 198 Pa. 459.
It is unnecessary that the contract be
in writing; a declaration by either the
contractor or the sub-contractor is suffl-
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ient to bind the maker againsb filing a
lien. Nice v. Walker, 153 Pa. 123; McElroy v. Braden, 152 Pa. 78; Tebay v.
Kirkpatrick, 146 Pa. 120.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This was a proceeding upon a mechanic's
lien filed by Hatel for $724. Hatel agreed
with Schell, the contractor, not to file any
lien; it is not stated whether or not this
agreement was in writing. The Court is
of the opinion that it matters not whether
it was in writing or parol. It is not necessary that a contract stipulating against
liens should be in writing. McElroy v.
Braden, 152 Pa. 78, and cases therein cited.
The agreement is a bar to Hatel's claim
of lien, and according to Stoneback v.
Waters, 198 Pa. 459, thejudgment must be
for the defendant. The Act of June 26,
1895, does not apply.
Judgment for the defendant.
MINNICH, J.

WOODY vs. HARRINGTON.
Wills-Devise of life estate-Power of sale
given to life tenant-Execution of the
power-.Requisites of deed.
STATED[ENT OF THE CASE

Her father by will gave to Sarah Adams
a tract of land in these words: "I give my
farm to Sarah for her own sole use, for her
life."
Sarah was married at the time the will
was written and was made executrix. In
a later clause, she was given the power to
sell the said farm, and directed to divide
the proceeds after his deith (she receiving
the interest on it meantime) among three
named persons equally.
A year after the death of the testator,
she contracted to sell the farm to Harrington in fee, and tendered a deed to him.
The deed made no reference to the power.
Harrington refused to accept it and she refused to make another, contending that
the title would be good.
She assigned her right to the purchase
money to Woody, and delivered to him
the deed, with authority to deliver it to
Harrington on his paying the money.
Woody again tendered it, but it was again
refused by the defendant.
HOUSER and MCINTIRE for the plaintiff.
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Power, given by will, to sell real estate
enables donee of the power to pass as good
title as the testator possessed. Swan v.
Covert, 138 Pa. 306.
While a deed should recite the authority
to execute, yet such recital is not essential
to its validity. Keefer v. Schwartz, 47 Pa.
•53 ; Kinter v. Jenks, 43 Pa. 445.
The possession of a life estate by executrix was no legal objection to her passing
a fee to the grantee. Doran v. Piper, 164
Pa. 430.
LONERGAN and RHODES, F. for the defendant.
The intention to execute the power must
appear in the instrument of conveyance.
Bingham's Appeal, 64 Pa. 345; Cf. 114 Pa.
502.
It must be so clear that no other reasonable intent can be imputed. 4 Kent 335;
Church v. Disbrow, 52 Pa. 219.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

A correct decision in this case depends
upon two questions:
(1). Did the will of testator give his
daughter the power to dispose of the estate
given her for life?
(2). If such power was given, is it necessary to a valid execution of the same,
that it be expressed or cited in the deed of
conveyance?
It must be admitted that powers may be
created by any one having an estate in the
land over which the power is to be exercised. No set form of words is required to
give rise to the power, if the intent to
create one be discoverable in the instrument alleged as giving it. A power may
often be implied without any express word
of grant. Burr v. Guiss, 1 Wharton 252.
The daughter, Sarah Adams, in the case
under consideration, was expressly given
the power to dispose of the farm given
her for life in a previous clause of the wi~l
of her father. A further citation of authorities or argument on this point would be
profitless.
There then being no question as to the
creation of the power, the remaining and
most important question is whether the
power given was properly and effectually
executed. According to the statement of
facts in the case, Sarah Adams offered her
vendee a deed without the recitation of the
power given her in the will, which he refused to accept, claiming it did not confer a
good title.
Where no special formality is required,
the rule of law is that any instrument in
which is manifested an intention to exe-
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power, is evidently intended to effect some
cute a power, and which is otherwise legal,
purpose, and would be absolutely without
will be held to be a valid execution thereeffect unless construed as in execution of
of.
the power; there will be such construcThere are cases which would confine the
tion and the power will be held executed.
manifestation to three cases, viz:
Lancaster v. Dolan, 1 Rawle .31 ; Taylor
(1). Where the power is referred to.
(2). Where the subject of the power is v. Smiley, 14 Phila. 76.
The intention may be ascertained when
disposed of or referred to.
the instrument can have no operation, ex(3). Wherethe instrument would be alcept in the execution of the power. Pepper's
together nugatory unless regarded as an
Will, 1 Parsons 436; Bingham's Appeal,
execution of the power.
64 Pa. 345.
If the deed in the case under considerThis case can be decided on that of Mcation is to be sustained it must be either
under the second or third rule, or it is ad- Creary v. Bomberger, 151 Pa. 325. Thewi!l
in that case, was as follows : "I give.and
mitted that the power was not referred to
bequeath to my beloved wife, my house
in the instrument of conveyance.
and lot in which I now reside, eta., to
It cannot be doubted or disputed that
the subject of the power-the farm-is have and to hold for and during her natural life ; and at the death of my said wife
disposed of, and it is equally true that the
all the property hereby devised to her,
deed would be nugatory, unless considered
etc., and if atany timeitshould be deemed
as an execution of the power, as the
advantageous to dispose of said house and
daughter had but a life estate and could
not therefore grant or dispose of the fee
lot, my executrix (his wife) is empowered
u nless such estate was expressly given her,
to sell and dispose of thesame," etc.
or in addition to her life interest she had
Chief Justice Paxson held, "that when
a donee of a power to sell land possesses
the power of disposal. It is an established
rule of law that a grantor can only convey
also an interest in the subject of the power,
what he really possesses.
a conveyance by him without actual referThe early Penna. cases held that, as a
ence to the power will not be deemed an
general rule, to be regarded as an execuexecution of it unless there be evidence of
tion, the instrument must refer to the
an intention to execute, or, at least, in the
face of evidence disproving such an intenpower, or actually dispose of the subject
of it. Wetherill v. Wetherill, 18 Pa. 265,
tion. We think there is abundant eviBingham's Appeal, 64 Pa.345.
dence that the wife intended to execute
It is thought however, that the true test
the power. It iq*true there is no reference
of the question of execution is the intent,
to it in the mortgage, and if it were an unwhich may be gathered from the whole
bending rule that such a reference must
instrument, and that where the intent is appear upon the face of the papers, the
manifested, although the method of manidefendant's position would be unanswerfestation may not fall under any of the
able.
above heads, it will suffice.
Another case equally applicable to the
In Bloggage v. Miles, 1 Story 427, Jus- one under consideration is that of Scott v.
tice Story said: "All theauthorities agree
Bryan, 194 Pa. 41. The testator gave to
that it is not necessary that the intent to
his niece, "as her own separate estate,"
execute the power should appear by ex- certain real estate "for her life with the
press terms or recitals in the instrument.
power to-sell at any time and give a good
It is sufficient that it should appear by
fee simple deed therefor." She executed a
words, acts or deeds demonstrating the
conveyance of the property in fee with
intent.
general warranty. No reference was made
How to ascertain the intention to exin the deed to the power.
ecute where there is no reference to the
Mr. Justice Mitchell decided that it was
power, has been the subject of numerous
a valid execution of the power. "The general rule in determining the Validity of
decisions. A very common case of the
manifestation of an intent to execute a
the execution of powers, is that the intenpower is where an instrument, whether a
tion of the donee to execute is the turning
deed or a will, executed by the donee of a
point. The subject of the power is fully
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described and the will of testator referred
to, though not the power itself. It is a
stronger case on this point than McCreary
v. Bomberger, 151 Pa. 323, where the evidencewas held to be abundant."
This being the vital question to a decision in this case and the only one argued
by counsel, we must decide in accordance
with the weight of authority, viz: "That
the deed offered to defendant and refused
by him was sufficient to convey a good
title."
It follows from what has been said that
judgment should be entered for plaintiff.
DAvIS, J.
ELY'S ADM'R vs. SHANK ET.AL.
Partnership-Agreementfor fixed period
-- Insolvent partner-Deathof insolvent
-Bill in equityfor dissolution-Rightsof
creditors.
STATE ENT OF THE CASE.
Ely, Shank and Lafland became partners in a saw-mill for the period of seven
years, stipulating that the death of any
should not work a dissolution ; that the
decedent's share should remain in the business, and that the administrator should be
paid either the interest thereon at six per
cent. or the net profits. It was also agreed
that the sole management of the business
should be with the survivors.' Ely was
insolvent when he entered into the partnership. He died three months subsequently. The amount invested by him in
the business was'$6000. Each of the partners contributed a like sum. The other
assets were $4450. The administrator, insisting on a settlement of the firm account
and the payment of Ely's share, filed the
bill in equity. Defendant demurred on
the ground that they had a right to retain
Ely's $6000 for six years longer, and at
that time their only duty was to pay the
interest or the profits.
KAUFmAN and JoNES for the plaintiff.
A partnership fora definite period may
be dissolved by either partner before the
termination of the period. Mason v. Connell, 1 Wharton 380; Slemmer's Appeal,
58 Pa. 168.
A provision to continue the partnership
after the death of a partner is void.
Laney v. Laney, 6 Denio (N. Y.) 241.
The administratorb are entitled to a set-
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tlement of the partnership accounts. Bank
v. O'Niel, 2 Sup. 306; Chipman v. Bank,
120 Pa. 86; Mark's Appeal, 85 Pa. 231;
Hicks v. Bank, 168 Pa. 638. It is contrary
to sound public policy to allow the rights
of creditors to be prejudiced by tying up
an estate for any term of years that an insolvent, prospective partner may consider
expedient.
BOUToN and MAYS for the defendant.
By virtue of an express agreement, a
partnership may be continued after the
death of one of the parties. Gratz v. Bayard, 11 S. & R. 41; Wilcox v. Derickson,
168 Pa. 335; Evans v. Watts, 192 Pa. 115.
The insolvency of a partner does not dissolve the paitnership. Arnold v. Brown,
24 Pick. 89; Seigel v. Chidsey, 28 Pa. 279.
It is not fraud, actual or constructive,
upon creditors for a debtor to enter into a
partnership for a fixed period, and stipulating that the death of a member during
thatperiod shall not work a dissolution.
Brew v. Hastings, 196 Pa. 222.
OPI ION OF THE COURT.
The only question for the court to decide
is whether this agreement is valid and
binding against the creditors.
The law is well settled that the death of
a partner will work a dissolution of the
partnership in the absence of agreement,
but where partners ehter into a perfectly
fair agreement we must look with some
favor upon the surviving members. If we
were to hold such agreement invalid, we
would be unable to express the difficulty
it would be to get people, to combine and
conduct industries, which, in this age of
progress, is an absolute necessity.
The learned counsel for the plaintiff
holds this agreement inequitable against
the creditors, but in his able argument he
overlooks the equities on the other side;
the creditors, in this case, are allowed by
the agreement 6 per cent., the maximum
legal rate of interest. If they are unwilling to accept this offer, they have another remedy, i. e., they can find a purchaser and sell Ely's share in the partnership.
If relief should be granted in this
case, we would be placing a stumblingblock at the doors which we have opened
for self-government; death is so uncertain,
it would be impossible to find people willing to combine; the effect this would have
on our nation can readily be seen. Year
by year, in the light of intelligent investigation, nature has parted with her secrets,
and we do not propose to place a check
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above things alone, guaranteeing no person'ssignature but the drawer's. Marine
National Bank v. N tional City Bank, 59
N. Y. 67.
The rule that when a bank pays a depositor's check on a forged endorsement,
it is responsible for the loss, does not apply'
where the depositor, as drawer, is the fault
or makes possible such forgery, as in the
present case.
In U. S. v. National Exchange Bank,
45 Fed. Rep. 163, in Emporia National
Bank v. Shotwell, 35 Kan. 360, and in
Robertson v. Coleman, 141 Mass. 231, the
doctrine is firmly established that a bank
was not liable for the payment of a check
SIMON vs. MOORE.
on a forged endorsement where the person
who committed the forgery and received
Negotiableinstruments-Collateralsecurity the money, was in fact the person to whom
-Fraudulentpersonation-Certification the drawer delivered the check, and
of check-.efusal to pay bonafide trans- whom he believed to be the payee named.
The check was made payable to Filler,
feree of drawer.
and his name was forged by Strope in endorsing the check back to Simon; should
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
the bank, ignorant of the forgery, pay
William Strope having a bond payable
the same, it would not in the absence of
to Adam Filler, and pretending to be
negligence be responsible for the money so
Adam Filler, applied to Simon for a loan
paid since the forger is the person for
on the bond as collateral. Simon agreed
whom the check was intended.
to make the loan and drew a check on
In the case of the Land Title and Trust
William Moore, his banker, payable to
Co.,
v. Northwestern Nat. Bank 196 Pa.
Adam Filler. Strope, for a consideration,
the facts were similar to those
230,
where
endorsed this in the name of A. Filler to
case and where the loss fell
present
in
the
Simon, who presented it to Simon, who
a man had fraudulently
the
drawer,
upon
presented it to Moore for certification and
obtained possession of the title deeds to a
Simon
Before
as
good.
it
Moore certified
certain property, and representing himsold the check he was notified by Moore
self as the owner mortgaged the property,
that he would not pay the check, because
receiving a check payable to the owaer,
of Strope's fraudulent personation of Filwhich he forged and collected the money.
ler. Assumpsit in the check.
Here the check was issued to the one
LoNGiBoTToM and WANNER for the
whom the drawer intended to designate as
plaintiff.
the payee. Mr. Justice Fell said, "There
MILLER and HAMBLEN for the defendis thus thrown upon the bank the risk of
ant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
antecedent fraud practiced upon the
drawer of the check, of which it has
The certification of a che6k by a bank
represents but three things, viz: First, neither knowledge nor means of knowledge," and "In such a case the intention
that the signature of the drawer is genuine;
with which the drawer issued the check
second, that the drawer has funds in the
has been carried out; the person has
bank sufficient to pay the check; third,
been paid to whom he intended payment
that it will retain such funds and pay them
should be made; there has been no misto the holder. Thus the certification of this
take of fact except the mistake which he
check after it came back into Simon's
made when he issued the check, and the
hands accomplished no other results than
loss is due not to the bank's error in failif he had had it certified before it ever left
ing to carry out his intention but primarhis hands in the first instance, viz : it
fixed the bank's responsibility in the three ily to his own error into which he was led
rein on the people who are willing to take
advantage of them, by declaring void an
agreement which was intended to continue for a fixed period, provided such
period is reasonable and made without
fraud.
The validity of contracts of this kind
was upheld in Gratz v. Bayard, 11 S. & R.
41 ; Wilcox v. Derickson, 168 Pa. 335;
and in Brew v. Hastings, 196 Pa. 222, which
is a case on all fours with the one at bar.
We recommend holding contracts of this
nature to be good and dismiss the bill at
the cost of the plaintiff.
DEVER, J.
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by deception previously practiced upon
him."
The loss in the present case having been
occasioned by the error of Simon, even
though he acted in good faith, there is no
reason either "legal or equitable, why it
should be shifted to another."
But in the present case the check has
not yet been paid by the bank. On the
contrary, upon learning £f the fraud, it refuses payment. Should the bank, knowing of the forgery, pay the check, it would
be attempting to validify a false endorsement and would be aiding the forger to
defraud the drawer, and since such knowledge of the forgery would be a good defense by the bank in a suit on the check
by the forger, even though he were the
party for whom the drawer intended the
check, I can see no reason why it would
not be as good or even a better defence in
the hands of the drawer, the one who occasioned the loss.
Th. general rule that a bank is liable for
money paid on a forged endorsement would
apply here with emphasis since the bank
was cognizant of such forgery. Seventh
National Bank v. Cook, 73 Pa. 483;
Rabb v. Penna. Co. for Insurance on
Lives, 3 Sup. 254; West Phila. Bank v.
Green, 3 Penny, 456.
This case presents the singular state of
affairs of a man suing on his own check
upon which was the forged endorsement
of the payee; but this does not modify, in
the least, the rule above stated, for itis beyond the power of the drawer, Simon, to
ratify the forged endorsement of the payee,
Filler. Assuming that the bank should
pay the check, the loss must fall upon the
drawer, Simon, for the bank would be
paying the check to the order of the man
whom the drawer intended should have
it. Or should the bank pay the check and
the endorser not be the intended payee,
the bank would have a right of recovery
against the person to whom it paid the
money, in this case, the drawer, Simon.
Corn Exchange National Bank v. Nassau
Bank, 91 N. Y. 74; Chambers v. Union
Nat. Bank, 78 Pa. 205; Tradesman's Nat.
Bank v. The Third Nat. Bank, 66 Pa. 435;
Act of April 5, 1849.
In either case the loss must fall upon
the drawer, who is the plaintiff in this
suit. But since the bank learned of the
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forgery it was bound to refuse payment
on the check, for to do otherwise would
be but attempting to validify a false endorsement, and would be but fixing upon
itself the responsibility for the money so
paid.
Justice Mitchell said in Nat. Bank v.
Fort Pitt Nat. Bank 159 Pa. 47, that "It
is always a good defence that the loss complained of is the result of the complainant's own fault or neglect, and it would
require a statute in very explicit terms to
do away with so universal a principle of
law founded on so incontestible a principle of justice."
For these reasons I think the bank is
justified in refusing payment of the check
and therefore judgment is rendered for the
defendant.
WELSH, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

We are not able to reach the conclusion at
which the learned court below has arrived.
A brief statement of the relation of the
parties may profitably precede a discussion
of it.
Simon was imposed on by Strope, by his
personation of Filler, and agreed to loan to
Strope a sum of money, on the assignment
of the bond payable to Filler. Strope'sassignmentof this bond passed no ownership
of it to Simon. But, Simon, having a deposit in Moore's bank, drew a check upon
it, for the amount to be loaned. This check,
which was payable to Filler, was delivered
to Strope, on the assumption that he was
Filler. After some interval, Strope, instead of presenting it to the bank, (probably because he suspected that the bank
would know that he was not Filler), endorsed it, and transferred it back to Simon;
Simon, of course, paying some consideration for it, possibly in cash. The deposit
in Moore's bank was still Simon's, and the
check had come back to Simon. Simon
instead of destroying it, obtained a certification of It from Moore, and then sold the
check to some other party. Before this sale
however, Moore had learned of Strope's
fraudulent personation of Filler, and notified Simon that he would not pay the
check. When Simon's transferee applied
to Moore for payment, he refused to pay
the check, in accordance with his word to
Simon, to whom, thereupon, Simon's
transferee; instead of suing Moore, returned the check, receiving the money.
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The result of these transactions was, the circumstances proven, the same. We
that Simon became again the owner of the are of opinion therefore, that Simon should
check which had been drawn on his own
have recovered nominal damages on the
deposit. A part of Simon's deposit had second count.
been set apart for it. When the check was
Judgment reversed.
presented by him, Moore should have paid
the money, if such payment would have
COLES vs. FAURE.
been valid as against Simon. Bilt how
could Simon contest the right of Moore to
Assumpsit-llegal sale-Oleomargarinemake a payment to himself?
Principal and agent-Accounting for
It is true that Moore, on refusing to
proceeds of illegal sale.
honor the check, would have been obliged
to credit Simon's account with the amount
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
with which he had previously debited it,
Coles-arranged
with Faure to sell oleoand, had that been done, Simon could
have drawn a fresh check on the fund. margarine in violation of law, and delivered to him $200 worth of that article.
But we are aware of no reason for holding
that it was incumbent on Simon to ac- Faure was to account for the proceeds in
two months. During that time Faure sold
quiesce in the refusal to pay the certified
check, and to draw another in hope that $150 worth, and he had the residue on
it would meet with a better reception. The hand. This he subsequently consumed.
Assumpsit for the value of the oleomargacertified check, endorsed and presented by
rine.
Simon, would have been as good a warrant
WAr,sH and PHIxLIPS for the plaintiff.
for the payment Qf its amount to Simon,
An agent will not be heard to deny the
as any other. Obtaining themoney, Simon
would have been .precluded, of course, title of his principal. Com. v. Sharps, 3
Sup. 554.
from demanding it a second time. Moore
An agent having money belonging to
could require nothing more. There should his principal on a closed account cannot
have been a recovery on the count for the set up, as his defence, the illegality of the
transaction. Wharton on Agency, 26;
check.
Elder v. Com. 9 Sup. 228; Hertzel v.
There is also a count for damages for the Geigley, 196 Pa. 422; Lestapies v. Ingrabank's refusal to honor the check, when ham, 5 Pa. 71.
WXTsoN and SHERBINE for the defendit was presented by Simon's transferee.
By receiving thedeposits, Moorehad tacitly ant.
The court will not lend its aid to enforce
agreed to honor Simon's checks. By cera contract when the party must, as a
tifying this particular check, Moore had ground for his action, disclose an illegal
expressly agreed to pay it. The refusal to transaction. Chestnut v. Harbang, 78 Pa.
pay it was primafacie a breach of both of 473; Gisaf v. Neval, 81 Pa. 354.
The contract is in violation of a statute
these contracts, whereby Simon has suf- and
is absolutely void. Mitchell v. Smith,
fered at least nominal damages. No facts 1 Binn. 110; Eberman v. Reitzel, i W. &S.
appear to justify the refusal to pay the 181.
The contract is entire. Any taint of ilcheck. The payment, as we have already
therefore affects the whole consuggested, would have entitled Moore to legality
tract. 51 N. H. 402.
reimbursement from the deposit. Indeed,
OPINION OF THE COURT.
he had already taken from the deposit the
amount of the check, when he certified it.
The first question to be decided in this
Though Moore had learned of Strope's case is: In what relation do the parties
fraudulent personation, he had informed stand to each other? Is it vendor and
Simon, and Simon had, nevertheless, en- vendee. partners or principal and agent?
dorsed the check to another. Simon would, Let us look at the contract. Coles arranged
of course, have been estopped from deny- with Faure to sell oleomargarine in violaing the right of Moore to honor the check, tion of law, and delivered $200 worth to
and the right to honor it, was, under the him. Faure was to account for the procircumstances, the duty to honor it. Even ceeds in two months. Proceeds of what?
if there had been no certification, Moore's Why of his sales to third parties. What
right and duty, Would have been under other construction can be put upon this?
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If Coles was selling the dleomargarine to
Faure, why should Faure account to
Coles for all the proceeds of his sales to
thirdparties? If he bought the oleomargarine from Coles his only duty would be
to pay Coles the price agreed upon. This
makes it very plain, that the parties do
not stand as vendor and vendee.
Are they partners? We think not.
There is nothing said about communion
of profits and losses, which Is an essential
element in partnership. Faure by the
agreement, was to account to Coles for the
proceeds, and by proceeds we understand
them to be all the proceeds, In the absence
of any evidence of a contrary intention.
Do they stand in the relation of principal and agent? Bouvier says: "An
agent is one employed to sell goods consigned or delivered to him." Evans says:
"A factor is an agent for the sale of goods
in his possession or consigned to him."
In this case Coles arranged with Faure to
sell oleomargarine, and, in pursuance of
this arrangement, delivered $200 worth of
this commodity to him to sell.
The facts do not state what compensation Faure was to feceive, but we assume
that there was a satisfactory arrangement
in regard to this matter. We are of the
opinion that the parties stand as principal
and agent, and having settled the question as to the relation of the parties, we
come to the following proposition: Can
a principal recover money retained in the
hands of his agent who received the same
as proceeds of an illegal sale of the principal's goods? The law on this point is
very clear. All authors of text-books
bearing on this point recognize it. "If
money has been actually paid to an agent
for the use of his principal, the legality of
the action of which it is the fruit does not
affect the right of the principal to recover it. * * * * The agent whose liability
arises solely from the fact of having received money for another's use, can have
no pretence to retain it." Dunlap's
Paley's Agency 62.-While the law will
not enforce an illegal contract, yet if a
servant or agent of another has, in the
prosecution of an illegal enterprise for his
master, received money or other property
belonging to his master, he is bound to
turn it over to him and can not shield
himself from liability therefor upon the
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ground of the illegality of the original
transaction." Wood on Master and Servant. sec. 202.-"An agent who has in his
hands money belonging to his principal,
on a closed or terminable account, cannot
set up as a defence to an action by the principal for money had and received, the
illegality of a part or the whole of the
transaction." Wharton on Agency. see.
26-250.-"The contract of the agent to pay
the money to his principal is not immediately connected with the illegal
transaction, but it grows out of the receipt
of the money for his principal." Story
on Agency. see. 347.
All of the above authorities have been
recognized in Pa., in the case Hertzler v.
Geigley, 196 Pa. 419. This action is not
based upon the illegal transaction nor Immediately connected with it, but it grows
out of the receipt of the money for his
principal. It is a separate contract.
In this case Faure sold $150 worth and
received the pay therefor. As far as this
Is concerned the contract is executed, and
upon the above authority we hold that he
must pay the amount to Coles. As to the
$50 worth which Faure did not sell, but
which was consumed by himself, Coles
cannot recover the value of it in thisaction
of assumpsit, for in order for him to recover in assumpsit for this latter amount,
he would be obliged to recover upon his
illegal contract upon which an action cannot be maintained.
Judgment for plaintiff for $150.
CRARY, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Coles contracted with Faure, that he
should deliver to the latter oleomargarine,
and that the latter should sell it, and account to-him within two months, for the
proceeds. In pursuance of this contract,
Coles delivered $200 worth of oleomargarine to Faure, and Faure sold $150 worthof it. He has never accounted to Coles
for the proceeds. He has also consumed
the remaining $50 vorth.
When the contract was made, and when
Faure made the sales, the sale of oleomargarine was unlawful in this state. the
plaintiff it is said encounters the principle
that the courts will not enforce illegal contracts. Is it called upon thus to do, in
this case?
The contract called for a series of acts,
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some to be done by Coles and some by
Faure. Coles was to deliver oleomargarine.
What was Faure to do? He was to sell
the oleomargarine. What then? He was
to pay the proceeds, less his commission,
over to Coles. He as much contracted to
do the latter as the former. If he did not
sell, after receiving the article, he violated
his contract. If he sold, but did not pay
over the proceeds, he violated his contract.
If he had paid over, Coles would have no
cause of action. Coles sues then because
Faure has not performed a part of his contract. The action is, either to obtain as
nearly specific performance as possible of
this contract, by compelling him to pay
what he agreed to pay, or to recover
damages for his non-performance.
If the action had been by Coles for
damages for Faure's refusing to sell, or by
Faure, for Coles refusal to compensate
him, according to the contract, it would
have failed because the courts do not
assist to compel the performance of illegal
contracts. They refrain not simply from
compelling the performing of the illegal
act, but also from compensating the party
who may have performed it. It might
have been suspected therefore, that the
courts would let Coles take the risk of
Faure's performing the contract to pay
over fhe money procured by sales of the
oleomargarine, and would not have assisted him to procure the performance of
it. It seems however that the suspicion
is not well founded. The courts will compel the agent, who has so far performed
his contract.as to sell the goods, to continue the performance of it, by paying the
money over. This is done under various
pretexts. One is, that thecontract can be
broken into two parts: that contemplating
the illegal act, and that contemplating
something after the illegal act, and that
performance of the latter can be compelled.
Possibly this is the principle of Lestapies
v. Ingraham, 5 Pa. 71. But, by that
method, the agent, after making the
illegal sale, ought to be allowed (as he is
not allowed) to recover his compensation.
Sometimes the suggestion is, that the
express contract will in no part be executed by the court, but that a new contract will be implied to take the place of
it, and that this new contract will be en347, asforced. Thus Story, Agency,

serts that "The agent whose liability
arises solely from the fact of having received money for another's use, can have
no pretense to retain it."
Sometimes the position is a bald refusal
to apply to the case of the agent the principle that courts will not enforce illegal
contracts. "An agent" says Wharton,
Agency . 26, 250, "who has in his hands
money belonging to his principal, on a
closed or terminable account, cannot set
up as a defence to an action by the principal for money had and received, the
illegality of a part or whole of a transaction."
It is evident that the invention of quasicontracts, may in large measure, annul
the salutary rule under which parties to
an illegal contract are denied the coercive
aid of the courts. If A conveys land to B
in fraud of his creditors, will the courts
feign a contract by B to re-convey it, or
feign a re-conveyance of it? If C pays D
$1000 to perform a crime, will the courts
feign, the crime not being, or being committed, a promise by D, to refund the
money ? Why then should the courts invent a promise, which in terms is identical with a portion of the express illegal
promise, on the part of the agent to pay
the money made by his sales to the principal?
The truth is, that the courts are often
staggered by the consequences of principles created by their predecessors, and
make exceptions which must be deemed
arbitrary for the purpose of avoiding appalling injustice or iniquity. And one of
these exceptions is, that when an agent
gets the property of his principal under an
illegal contract, he must return it if the illegal object has not been executed, or, if
the execution of the illegal object has
brought to the agent the equivalent in
money, or other property, of the articles
received by him, he must account for this
money or other property. Hertzler v.
Geigley, 196 Pa. 419; Elder v. Corr, 9 Super.
228; Commonwealth v. Shober, 3 Super.
554. In short, the illegal contract of
agency will be dissected, and as to parts of
it the parties will be refused the aid of the
courts, while as to other parts, this aid
will be extended.
Judgment affirmed.
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compensation for the whole time. If so,
the burden of proof in regard to his emHirinq-P r2sonalservices--Definiteperiod ployment elsewhere, or his ability to ob- ~rtongful dicharge-Successive ac- tain employment, must necessarily rest
on the defendant. All evidence in mititions of assumpsit.for compensation.
gation is for a defendant to give. In its
YEAGLEY and EBBEirT for the plaintiff. nature it is affirmative, and hence it is for
A servant, wronsh'ully discharged, may him to prove who asserts it. But the"
recover for the whole period of the con- possibility of obtaining other similar emtract. Wilke v. Harrison, 166 Pa. 202;
ployment or the fact that other similar
Kirk v. Hartman, 63 Pa.-97.
employment was obtained bears upon the
The servant may treat the contract as
existing and sue at each period for the sal- case only in mitigation of damages and is
ary then due. Hamur v. Beaver, 31 Pa. therefore a part of the defendant's case."
58; Telephone Co. v. Root, 17 W. N. C. It is not a part of the plaintiff's case to
200.
prove that he failed to find other employIf the judgment in the first action is
only for the amount due at that time, the ment after using due diligence to secure
it, but the duty of the defendant to prove
action will not be conclusive. Subsequent
actions may be brought for amounts fall- that the plaintiff could have obtained
ing due. Allen v. Colliery Engineer's Co.,
other employment of a similar character
196 Pa. 512; Kirk v. Hartman, 63 Pa. 97.
in the same community, if he would
BRENNAN and LAUER for the defend- mitigate the damages. Wolf v. Studeant.
The damages which a servant is entitled baker, 65 Pa. 459; Chamberlin v. Morgan,
to .recover for a wrongful dismissal con- 68 Pa. 168; Emery v. Steckel, 126 IPa. 171;
Costigan v. R. R., 2 Denis, 609. The
stitutes an entire cause of action for which
recovery may be had in a single action. plaintiff in view of the above principle is
Successive actions cannot be maintained
entitled to recover the full salary, if enon an entire and indivisible contract.
Eisenhower v. School District, 13 Sup. 51; titled to a judgment, since the defendant
Greenlief's Evidence .527.
has offered no evidence to mitigate the
damages.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Is the first suit a bar to the present acThis is an action of assumpsit for salary
upon the following stated case: Helps tion? In the maxim, "Nemo debit vexaria
employed Hilliard as clerk for the period si constet curiaequod si pro una et eadem
of 18 months at $25 per week, but at the causae." is found the answer to the quesend of 4 months discharged him. Hilliard tion. There can be but one suit mainrefrained from seeking other work and tained on an entire claim. Logan v.
tendered his services at the beginning of Caffrey, 30 Pa. 196; Buck v. Wilson, 113
Pa. 523; Hill v. Joy, 149 Pa. 243. The
every week for six weeks, when he brought
suit, declaring for the compensation for 6 court in Hill v. Joy said: "There is no
precise rule for determining what makes
weeks at $25 per week. Six weeks after
that he brought a second action for the an entire cause of action. It depends
compensation of these weeks. The first upon the facts of the particular case, (and
is often a difficult question)." The docaction resulted in a verdict for $150 with
trine of Bendernagle v. Cocks, 79 Wend.
interest. In the 2nd action, defendant
207, approved in Buck v. Wilson, 113 Pa.
pleads resjudicata.
The first question which the case raises 423, is that "where a party hath several demands or existing causes of action growis whether a discharged servant must
make an effort to seek other employment ing out of the same contract, or resting in
before he is entitled to bring an action for matter of account, which may be joined
or sued for in the same action, they must
salary. The law on this point has been
laid down conclusively in King & Gra- be joined; and if the demands or causes of
ham v. Sturen, 44 Pa. 99, one of the first action be split up and a suit brought for a
part only and subsequently a second suit
cases decided in Pennsylvania in which
the question was involved. Justice for the residue, the first action may be
Strong, in delivering the opinion of the pleaded in abatement or in bar of the
court, said: "In such a case, the plaintiff second action." Logan v. Caffrey, Supra,
is entitled, primafacie, to the stipulated lays down the rule as follows: "Where
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the consideration is fully executed and
there is no stipulation of severance, the
obligation to pay is indivisible and entire,
as much as an obligation to build a house,
to make a statue, or to paint a picture."
Is a contract of service with salary payable in periodical instalments an entire
or divisible contract? If the plaintiff had
continued in the service of the defendant
and failed to receive his salary as it fell due,
it is conceded that he would be entitled
to an action, after demand, for each installment. The contract is unquestionably
divisible. Such being the case, how does
the discharge of the servant by the master
change the nature of the contract? What
precludes him from breaking the contract
as existing and suing as his salary becomes due? The Supreme Court has decided the question in Telephone Co. v.
Root, 17 W. N. C. 200; and Allen v. Colliery
Engineers' Co. 196 Pa. 512, and it must be
considered as settled that, where a servant
has been wrongfully discharged, he can
treat the contract as existing, and a judgment recovered by him against his master
for salary due at the time the action was
brought, is not a bar to an action for salary
subsequently falling due, his readiness to
serve being considered as equivalent to
actual service. Therefore, judgment must
be entered for the plaintiff for the amount
claimed with interest.
Judgment for PLAINTIFF.
GERBER, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

After one suit on the contract, a second
has been brought. Is this possible? On a
lease, or bond, or note, etc., providing for
payment of instalments at different times,
an action can be brought for any instalment
falling due, and the lease, bond or note does
not merge in the judgment, so as to make
a second action on it impossible. Merchants Ins. Co. v. Algeo, 31 Pa. 446. The
fact that one judgment has been recovered
does not preclude the recovery of a second
for another instalment. Hilliard was employed for 18 months, but was to receive
$25 per week. Twenty-five dollars were
payable at the end of each week. A suit
for the first week's wages, would not prevent a later suit for the second week's. So,
one suit for the compensation of six weeks
ending in a judgment for him, Hilliard

could bring another for the wages of the
seventh week, or for the wages of the
seventh and eighth weeks, or for the
wages of all the weeks following those
whose wages had been recovered on the
first action, and preceding the bringing of
the present action. Allen v. Colliery Engineers Co. 196 Pa. 512; Cf. Kane v. Fisher,
2 W. 246, Limitations, 448.
The principle just stated would have
prevailed, had Hilliard actually continued
in the service of Helps. He was however
dismissed. He did not in fact, render service after his dismissal. If the dismissal
had precluded Hilliard's tendering his service, or continuing ready to render it, and
given him, for remedy, only an action for
damages for the repudiation of the contract, he could not have divided the damages and made each portion the foundation of a distinct action. He must have
in one action claimed all that he intended
to claim. 196 Pa. 512, upra.
The courts however, give him an option.
He may tender service, or hold himself
ready to perform it. He will then be
treated as having performed it. The defendant will be considered simply as failing to pay the money considered as earned
underthe contract, and, as already seen,
succeqsive actions can be maintained for
the compensation successively falling due.
In such cases, the actidn is, substantially,
an action of debt, and it specifically executes the contract of the promissor. It is
only when the plaintiff has chosen to
waive the specific execution of the contract, and to sue for damages, that he is
incapable of dividing his claim, and maintaining a series of suits for the parts.
Hilliard, it distinctly appears, declared
in his first action, for the contractual compensation of the first six weeks following
his dismissal, and he recovered $150, the
sum declared for. Nor is he now suing for
damages for the breach, but for the compensation for the second series of six weeks,
according to the terms of the contract.
With the view heretofore expressed, it
is impossible to reconcile Eisenhower v.
School District, 13 Super. 51, which was
argued 17 days before the case of Allen v.
Colliery Engineers' Co. The doctrine of
the judgment in the latter case must prevail.
Judgment affirmed.
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BRADLEY vs. CONNELL.
Injunction-Easement acquired by grant
-Essentials of an abandonment-Adverse possession--Renunciationby nonuser-Questionfor the jury.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Connell owned a tract which cornered
at two roads, "A" and "B," crossing
each other at right angles. Behind the
tract on both roads was a small tract
owned by Bradley which had belonged to
the former owner of Connell's, and which
had been by that owner conveyed with a
right of passage, afoot and by vehicles,
along a lane (described) to the "A" road.
Without contract with Connell, Bradley
had for 27 years been going by a definite
way over Connell's land to "B" road, and
had used but three times in that
period the way to "A" road. For 15 of
these years Connell had been ploughing
and planting the soil in the way to the
"A" road, as if no right of way over it
existed. He began October 17, 1899. to
erect a building on "A" road that would
sever the way at the entrance to that road.
Thereupon Bradley filed this bill to restrain him.
CORE and Fox for the plaintiff.
Inj unction is the proper remedy. Weaver
v. Getz, 16 Sup. 418; Manbeck v. Jone13,
190 Pa. 171; Hackes' Appeal, 101 Pa. 145.
The right of way has not been extinguished by adverse possession. No prescriptive right has been created. Lindeman v. Lindsey, 69 Pa. 93; Jennison v.
Walker, 11 Gray 423; Owen v. Fields, 102
Mass. 114.
The adverse use must be such as is inconsistent with the existence of the easement. The non-user by the owner of the
dominant estate must be the result of the
use by the owner of the servient estate.
Bomba'igh V.Miller, 82 Pa. 203; Arnold v.
Stevens, 41 Mass. 106; Barnes v. Lloyd,
112 Mass. 231.
DONAHOE and HOAGLAND for the defendant.
Whether or not an easement has.been
abandoned should be submitted to the
jury. 9 S.& R. 26. Non-user of an easement united with an adverse use of the
servient estate inconsistent with the existence of the easement, will extinguish it.
Jennison v. Walker, 11 Gray 423; Pope v.
Deveraux, 5 Gray 409: Cartwright v.
Maplesden, 53 N. Y. 622; Erb v. Brown,
69 Pa. 217; Weaver v. Getz, 16 Sup. 418.
The plaintiff having lost his right of

way to "A" road, he cannot now claim it
as a way of necessity. He has another
way (to and over "B" road) and mere inconveniencewill not constitute suchnecessity. Ogden v. Grove, 38 Pa. 487.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
In this case Bradley files a bill in equity
to enjoin the erection of a building on his
way to "A" road by Connell, the defendant, thereby severing the use of his entrance to that road over the right of way
which had been granted to the plaintiff
by the original owner of the combined estates. Twenty-seven years have elapsed
since this grant was made to Bradley. He
has used the said way but three times in
this period, and the facts are indefinite as
to the dates of these usages. Though for
fifteen years Connell has tilled the soil in
the way leading to "A" road, yet the evidence is insufficient to show Bradley's
abandonment. To showan abandonment
of an easement created by grant, three essential elements are necessary to be
proved; viz, non-user, intention to abandon, and damage to the owner of the servient estate. In this case they remained
unproved.
The question then is, whether or not
an injunction is the plaintiff's proper
remedy. Weaver v. Getz, 16 Supeiior
Court 418, is, in point of fact, very similar
to the case at bar, but we believe the two
should be distinguished. The cases are
parallel in that in each one the plaintiff
had a right of way by grant, but for sometime used another route in preference over
the land of the defendant. In Weairer v.
Getz, the plaintiff was properly granted
an injunction to prevent the defendant
from interfering with his use of the
granted road. But, in that case, the
plaintiff had acquired no easement in the
road which he had chosen to use in preference, and if the injunction had been refused,the plaintiff would have had no
certain exit from his property, and the
enjoyment of it, as a consequence would
have been hampered.
In the case at bar, Bradley has acquired
an easement in the way to "B" road. He
has used it for twenty-seven years. Having during this time used the way to "A"
road but three times, and the "B" way
being the only other way of exit he must
have used it almost daily. This, accom.
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panied by the fact that it does not appear
that Connell ever interfered with Bradley's use of the way to "B" road, is evidence that Bradley used the way adversely. According. to Jones v. Crow, 32 Pa.
398; Wallace v. Presb. Church, Ill Pa. 164,
and abundant other authority, the adverse use of land for over twenty-one years,
creates an easement.
Since Bradley has an easement in the
way to "B" road, which road seems his
preference, there is no necessity for him
to use the way to "A" road. He, therefore, has an adequate remedy at law for
the damage which he sustains.
The bill is dismissed.
KLINE, J.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.

Bradley's land and Connell's, had
formerly belonged to the same person.
That person, in his deed to Bradley,
granted with the land, a right of passage,
afoot or by vehicles, along a described
lane, to the A road. Connell, who now
owns the servient land, has begun to erect
a building on A road, which would obstruct the debouchment of the lane on that
road. Hence this bill in equity praying
for an injunction.
Apparently, Connell's act portends the
deprivation of Bradley of a right. That
this right once existed is ascertained.
Has it been lost? In twenty-seven years,
Bradley has used the way but three times.
Let us suppose that these uses were at the
beginning of that interval, and that for at
least 26 years, Bradley has never travelled
the way. Would this be an extinction
9f his right? It seems reasonably clear
that in Pennsylvania a non-user for that
period of time, would not put an end to an
easement which originated in a grant.
Bombaugh v. Miller, 82 Pa. 203; Butz v.
Ihrie, 1 R. 218; Nitzell v. Paschall, SR.
82; Lindeman v. Lindsey, 69 Pa. 93; Erb
v. Brown, 69 Pa. 216; Weaver v. Getz, 16
Super. 418; Hayford v. Spokesfield, 100
Mass. 491. The proven non-user by Bradley is not sufficient to support an inference that his right has ceased.
In addition to Bradley's non-user, there
is a user of the ground covered by the
way, by Connell. For fifteen years the
latter had, when he began to erect the
building, been ploughing and planting
the soil. This operation probably made

the way impracticable for eight or nine
months of each of these years. The adverse user, which would extinguish the
easement, must be continuous and endure
for the period of twenty-one years.
Bradley for twenty seven years, had
been going by a definite way, over Connell's land, to B road. The use of this
way began synchronously with the cessation of the use of the other lane to A road.
So far as appears, no grant preceded it,
except the grant which is presumed from
an adverse user for 21 years. It is conceivable that about this time, there was
an agreement between Cora 2ell and Bradley, that the latter should use the new
route, and abandon the earlier. The question before us is, (1) was the evidence sufficient to submit to the jury to find such an
agreement, and (2) if, on it, such an agreement were found to have been made,
would the"agreement be valid?
(1) Grants are presumed from various
circumstances. A use for 21 years, whenever the user wishes, and without consent
of the owner of the soil, would support
such a presumption. So, we think may
other facts. The use by Bradley of the
way to B road, began with the disuse of
the way to A road. The continuance of
the use of the former, proceeded pari
passu with the discontinuance of the use
of the latter. The use of the soil of the
way by Connell is also naturally explained, consistently with the legality of
his conduct, by the same hypothesis. It
would be a mistake to infer, from the principle that the possession by Bradley of a
way to B road which connects with A
road, would not justify Connell in closing
up the way to the latter. Manbeck v.
Jones, 190 Pa. 171; Weaver v. Getz, 16
Super. 418, that the use of tne way to B
road had no evidential value with respect
to an agreement between Connell and
Bradley.
(2) Will such an agreement be valid?
If necessary, a written agreement, a grant,
might be presumed. Grants, as we have
seen, have been presumed from adverse
user. Whatever form of conveyance
would be necessary, it may be inferred that
the parties made. The transaction was by
hypothesis in substance, an exchange of
ways. User of the new way was assumed.
Disuse of the old simultaneously began.
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Meantime, Bradley has apparently acquired an incontestable right by the adverse use, suffered, It may be, because of
the relinquishment of the right to the
other. Under such circumstances, we
think the statute of frauds does not require the contract to be proved by deed.
or other writing. Cf. Cartwright v.
AMaplesden, 53 N. Y. 622; Erb v. Brown,
69 Pa. 216.
It is enough that the plaintiff's cas
is not clear. We think the evidence
might properly be submitted to a jury, in
an action at law, to ascertain whether a
renunciation of the way to A road did not
take place by agreement, and that a verdict finding that it did, would be upheld.
The bill therefore was properly dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
ST. JOHN vs. PRIEST'S EXECUTORS.
Donatio mortis causa-Gift of watch and
contents of trunk-Effectiveness of delivery of key in transferring dominion
over contents of trunk-Burden of proof
of access.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
A clergyman on his deathbed called his
trusted servant, John St. John, and in the
presence of one witness, handed to the
servant his vest containing his gold
watch, and also the key of his trunk, telling him he would find $I100 in the trunk.
"These are foryou, John," he said. The
clergyman died the following day. The
servant did not take the articles, but in
the excitement of the illness of his employer, left vest with watch and key in
the room.
Executor now refuses to deliver gifts.
The servant sues. Clergyman left will
but did not dispose of watch or the $1100,
which was found in the trunk. He made
no bequest to the servant in the will.
GER3ER and ELES for the plaintiff.
The gift of the watch was a complete
and valid donatio mortis causa. Walsh's
A'ppeal, 122 Pa. 177; Gourley v. Linsinbigler, 51 Pa. 349.
The delivery of the key was an effective delivery of the money in the trunk,
not merely because it was a symbolical delivery, but because its delivery was a relinquishment by the donor of all domin-
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ion and control over the contents, the key
furnishing the means of obtaining possession. Gourley v. Linsenbigler, 51 Pa.
345; Parker's Estate, 15 Pa. C. C. 7;Norris
v. Page, 2 Luz. L. Obs. 259; Parthimer's
Estate, 1 Pears. 433; Stewart v. Lindermuth, 4 Del. Co. 384; Debinson v.
Emmons, 158 Mass. 594; Jenkins v. Lee,
2 Forum 181.
The testimony of one credible witness is
sufficient to establish such a gift. Wells
v. Tucker, 3 Binn. 370; Michener v. Dale,
23 Pa. 59; Pryor v. Morgan, 170 Pa. 568.
SCRANZ and MCKEEHAN for the defendant.
If the articles are not cumberous, if
capable of being taken into the hand and
actually delivered by the donor, the delivery 6f the key is insufficient. Keepers
v. Fidelity Ins. Co. 56 N. J. L. 302; Coleman v. Parker, 114 Mass. 30; Ward v.
Turner, 2 Ves. 431.
An absolute delivery and a continuous
change of possession are essential requisites of a good donatio mortis causa.
Meach v. Meach, 24 Vt. 591; Craig v.
Craig, 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 78; Brown v. Brown,
18 Conn. 410; Pryor v. Morgan, 170 Pa.
573.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Donationes causa mortis have their
origin far back in the annals of jurisprudence. They are coeval with the laws of
Draco, made a part of the Institutes of
Justinian, defined in the celebrated Commentaries of Sir William Blackstone and
for a long time a familiar method of disposition of personalty in these states. "A
donatio causa mortis is a gift of a chattel,
made by a person in his last illness, or in
periculo mortis, subject to the implied
condition that if the donor recover or if
the donee die first the gift shall be void."
Per Gibson, C. J., in Nicholas v. Adams, 2
Wharton 17.
By the Civil Law five witnesses were required, but we have not adopted such precautions; though such donations amount
to a revocation pro tanto of written wills.
"Though essentially testamentary, technically, they take effect or, more properly
speaking, are inchoate, in the lifetime of
donor, and hence may be proved by parol
and a single witness." Wells v. Tucker,
3 Binney 370. There are four requisites
which must be present in order to constitute a valid donatio causa mortis, viz., 1.
The property given must be personalty. 2.
The gift must be made in view of the
giver's impending death. 3. The donor
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must die of the disorder. 4. There must
be a delivery of the tiling given.
Have all these requisites been met in
the case at bar? The decedent called the
claimant to his bedside, and handed him
a vest, which contained his gold watch,
and also the key of his trunk, telling him
he would find $1100.00 in trunk.
"These are for you John," he said.
John laid the vest, with watch and key, in
the room by reason of the excitement of
the illness.
The first requirement is satisfied, i. e.,
the gift was of personal property. The
second requisite is answered for the donor
was in periculo mortis. The third is also
met because the donor did die the next
day. Too great an interval did not exist
between the making of the gift and the
death of the donor, which was one day.
There seems to be no specified duration of
time laid down in the books.
In Nicholas v. Adams, 2 Wharton 17,
14 days elapsed; Wells v. Tucker, 3 Binney 370, 3 days; Michener v. Dale, 23 Pa.
63, 6 hours; Grymes v. Thorne, 49 N. Y.
21, 5 months.
The fourth requisite involves the vital
questions to be determined in this action.
Was there a sufficienf delivery? And, (a)
Was there a sufficient delivery of the
watch? (b) Was there a valid delivery of
the $1100.00 in the trunk by means of the
passing over to claimant the key of the
trunk? (c) Was there a continuity of
possession in claimant of these articles
from time of gift, until death of donor.
(a) We find no difficulty in deciding
the first proposition. The delivery of the
watch was sufficient, in fact, the most
complete possible delivery. The delivery
of the thing itself. Walsh's Appeal, 122
Pa. 177. "And it was the completeness of
this delivery in execution of the gift,
which excluded the rights of the administrator."
Michener v. Dale, 23 Pa. 59.
There must be actual delivery to or for
the donee where such delivery can be
made. Trough's Estate, 75 Pa. 115. (b)
We have not been able to find any
Supreme Court decision (in which it was
necessary to the decision of the case) holding that the delivery of the key of a trunk
pa.Qsed property contained in the trunk.
A dictum is to be found in Gourley v.
Linsenbigler, 51 Pa. 345, as follows: "That

is when a person in his sickness, apprehending his dissolution near, delivers or
causes to be delivered any personal goods
or chattels to another, or puts the physical means of dominion over them into
his power, to keep them for himself, or for
some one else in case of the donors decease. The delivery of a trunk key has
been deemed to amount to a delivery of a
trunk and its contents."
In an opinion by Judge Ashman the
following language is to be found. "According to the narrative the testator told
his wife that he had put some money in
the safe for her, and that she was to take
it and use it when she wanted it. He
gave her at the same time a key to the
safe. A more effectual delivery of property than this could not well have been
made." Parker's Estate, 15 Pa. C. C. 7.
Another Common Pleas decision bearing
on the point, is, that of Judge Mercur in
Norris v. Page, 2 Luz. Legal Obs. 259.
While there seems to be a dearth of decisions on this point in Pennsylvania, yet,
in other jurisdictions, we find many cases
have been adjudicated relative to this
proposition. In Harris v. Clark, 3 N. Y.
93, the Court says, "Gifts however, are
valid without consideration or actual value
paid in return. But there must be a delivery of possession. The thing given
must be put in the hands of the donee, or
placed within his power by delivery of
the means of obtaining it."
In Debinson v. Emmons, 158 Mass. 593,
the court, quoting from Coleman v. Parker,
114 Mass. 30, used these words: "the term
delivery is not to be taken in such a narrow
sense as to import that the chattel or property is to go literally into hands of recipient and to be carried away." Again in
the same case is found the following: "We
have no doubt that a trunk and its contents might be effectually given and delivered, in such a case, by a delivery of the
key, not as a symbolical delivery of the
property, but because it is the means of
obtaining possession." Ward v. Turner,
2 Ves. Sen. 431, 433; Debinson v.
Emmons, Supra. And still again, in the
same case, quoting from Wing v. Merchant, 57 Maine 383: "If the key in this
case had been placed in the hands of the
witness, the donor relinquishing all control and dominion over it and parting with
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it absolutely, or, if by direction of the
donor, the witness bad taken it into her
possession and exclusive control, there
would have been a sufficient delivery to
make out a full title in plaintiff."
It has often been asserted that the situation, as well as the nature of the thing,
must be taken into consideration, and
only such delivery was requisite as, under
all the circumstances, the donor could
conveniently make. Keepers v. Fidelity
Title and Deposit Co., 56 N. J. Law. We
are of opinion that the delivery of the key
was a sufficient delivery of the $1100.00 in
the trunk. We base our opinion upon
these reasons, (1) the delivery of the key
was the means of obtaining possession of
the money. This, we think, is equivalent
to the actual handing over of the money.
The possession is just as exclusive and
free from the control of others; (2) that the
situation would scarcely admit of a
manual delivery of the money. We have
not been enlightened as to the fact,
whether this money was metal or paper
money. If metal a manual delivery was
out of the question.
The fact that claimant laid aside the
vest in the room, in order that, he might
attend to the wants of his master, shows
the serious condition of decedent, and the
excitement necessarily attendant on such
occasions.
. (c) Was there a continuity of possession
in claimant of these articles from time of
gift until death of donor?
It has been argued by counsel for the defendaut that the claimant, by reason of
having laid the vest aside in the room,
and leaving it there until after the death
of donor, had not the exclusive control of
articles, but that the donor had resumed
posession.
To support this view they have cited
several cases, among these being Bunn v.
Markham, 7 Taunton 339. We think this
case is distinguishable from the case at
bar.
In that case the property was taken out
of a chest of the testator, looked over by
him, and sealed up in three different
parcels; being so sealed he declares that it
is intended for the witnesses's mother and
sister, and directs that it shall be given to
them after his decease. The testator intrusted the keys to the chest to witness's
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mother. Finding out witness had obtained
possession of keys, he expressed great displeasure, and caused the keys to be replaced in the basket of keys which was always kept in his bedroom, and he continued to express anxiety concerning
thie keys.
His direction was "thatit shall be given
to them after my decease." There was
not the intention to give instantly, but the
intention was to give in the future.
In the case at bar, the key and the
watch in the vest were left lying in the
room by reason of the attention required
of servant toward his dying master. The
decedent thought the gift had been completed. He not only refrained from expressing any anxiety as to the donation,
but even did not refer to it again, though
be continued alive until the next day.
Further, he made a will in which these
articles were not disposed of. Again this
was John's home as well as that of his
master, and it was only natural under the
circumstances for him to have done that
which he did do.
He intended to remove the vest as soon
as the excitement of the illness had subsided, but his first duty was to his dying
friend.
Smith v. Smith, 2 Strange 955, has also
bden cited. Gibbs, Justice, in Bunn v.
Markham, Supra, sayis: "Smith v. Smith,
is a very confused case." We consider
this satisfactory ground for refraining
from discussing a case, which the courts
have declared "confused" almost one hundred years ago. Hemphill's Estate, 180
Pa. 90, has no bearing on this case as to
continuity of possession. The decedent
manifested no more than an intention to
give the boxes to the claimant, and her
direction to hand them over after her
death did not constitute a delivery because the articles did not, with her knowledge, leave her possession, nor did she at
any time relinquish, knowingly, her
dominion over them.
In the case of Basket v. Hassel, 107 U.S.
615, the following is found in the opinion
of the court: "the property in the fund did
not presently pass, but remained in the
donor, and the donee was excluded from
its possession and control during the life
of the donor. That qualification of the
right, which would have belonged to him
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if he had become the present owner of the
fund establishes that there was no delivery
of possessio,, according to the terms of the
instrument, and that as the gift was to
take effect only upon death of donor, it
was not a present executed gift mortis
causa, but a testamentary disposition."
The above case is readily distinguishable from the case at bar. In Jenkins v.
Lee, 2 Forum 181, (1897), where the court,
in its opinion, discussed the point in controversy, we find the following language
used: "It was suggested that the failure
of Emma Jenkins to take away the brooch
,until after the death of Mrs. Leerepels the
hypothesis of an executed gift. She took
the brooch from Mr. McAndrews, and retained it in her possession for a while,
probably in her hand. She then laid it
aside in the room until the expected death
had occurred and then todk it to her
home.
It does not appear that she left the room
until after the death. It cannot matter.
What had happened was sufficient to pass
the conditional ownership to her. That
ownership surely could not be destroyed
by laying the brooch aside aud calling for
it after the death. There was no change
of the will of the donor, no revocation of
the gift."
We have come to the following legal
conclusions, viz: 1. There was a sufficient
delivery of the watch. 2. There was a
valid delivery of the $1100.00 in the trunk
by the delivery of the key. 3. The donor
had parted with all dominion over the
property, and no resumption of possession,
evertook place in him.
The statement of facts reads: "The servant sues." From this we must assume,
until the contrary appears, that the action
of assumpsit is the proper action.
Judgment for plaintiff.
POINTS, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

Did the decedent make a valid gift of
the watch and of the $1100 in the trunk?
The witness who proves thegift, is disinterested and therefore competent, although
the mouth of the donee is closed by the
common law, which late legislation has,
so far as this case is concerned, not
altered.
One of the essentials of a gift of chattels,
whether absolute or causa mortis is, that

they be delivered with the intention that,
with their passing into the possession of
the donee, or of some one for him, the
ownership thereof shall simultaneously
pass. Were there this passage into possession and this intention?
From the circumstances and the acts
and words of the deceased, the propriety
of the inference of his intention that the
watch and the $1100 should become and be
the property of St. John, does not seem to
be questionable.
Was there a delivery of possession? The
vest was handed to St. John, having in its
pocket, the watch. Though he may not
have touched the watch, it, as much as the
vest, went into his possession. The money,
however, was in a trunk. Where was
that trunk? Was it in the same room, in
the presence of the donor and donee? Or
was it in another room or house? The
evidence does not instruct us.
The donee's possession consists in such
a relation to the thing that he can control
it, and exclude the control of another. If
there was such a possession in this case,
we must discover in the facts the loss of a
control by and intention to control, by the
donor, and the forming of-an intention to
control and the gaining of a control by
the donee.
The donor gave the key of the trunk to
the donee. Had the trunk been present,
this would have given control of the*
trunk and of the money to St. John, not
because the key is a symbol of the money
or of the trunk, but because it was the
physical means of opening the latter and
reaching its contents. Debinson v. Emmons, 158 Mass. 592; Coleman v. Parker,
114 Mass. 30; Parker's Estate, 3 D. R. 370.
But if the trunk was not in view, not in
the room, not where St. John had a right
to go- to it, not where he could go to it,
the delivery of the key did not put in him
the control of the trunk and of the money
in it. It would be necessary to remove
the obstacle to the access to the trunk.
The prohibition against going to it must
be revoked. If the room in which it is,
is locked, it must be unlocked or the
means and authority to unlock it must be
imparted to St. John. To be able to open
a trunk if he gets to it, gives no possession
of it, or of what is in it, if one is unable to
get to it. Possession of the key to the
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ADAMS vs. JAMES.
trunk therefore, was not equivalent to
possession of the trunk, unless the trunk
was physically, morally and legally ac- Decedent's estates- Concurrent adminiscessible. Now, while it is likely that St.
tration-Collateral attack-DomicileJohn had free access to the trunk, and
Act of M3arch 15, 1832.
could at any time, have opened it, and removed the money, it does not appear that
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
he had the access, and could have taken
Defendant executed a mortgage for
the money. The burden is upon him to $1400 on her home in Carlisle to Francis
show the donatio, and therefore to show
Adams. On his death letters of administhat he had access to the trunk and contration were granted by the register of
trol over its contents.
wills of Perry County, to his son Thomas.
The remark of the deceased that St.
The following day and without knowlJohn "would find $1100 in the trunk" is edge of the previous grant the register of
not decisive that he had acquired or was
Cumberland County graited letters to the
acquiring power over the trunk. It may
plaintiff, who brought this .eirefaciason
have meant that he would find the $1100
the mortgage. The defendant specially
after, the donor's death. The speaker may pleaded that the letters to Adams were
not have. contemplated that the donee
void. The only evidence on the point of
would take or attempt any measures to jurisdiction of the register, was that
reach the trunk, to open it, to possess
Francis Adams had for twenty years rehimself of the money in it, until the
sided in Perry County, and that six
donor's death.
months before his death, he came over to
The watch was in the vest pocket. The
Cumberland and there remained in the
vest was handed to the donee. He therefamily of a daughter until his death.
fore had possession of it. Did he relinDAvIs and MACCONNEL for the plainquish the possession of it? If he did, did
tiff.
such relinquishment annul the gift? St.
The principal residence of the decedent
John, excited and distracted by the
been in Cumberland county atthe
solemn event that was enacted, the dying having
time of his death, the register of said
watch
of his patron, left the vest with the
county had exclusive jurisdiction. Act
and the trunk key in the room. We do March 15, 1832; Frick's Appeal, 114 Pa. 29.
The decree of the register is conclusive
not think that in so doing, he abandoned
reversed on appeal. Bradford v.
the possession. There was no one near to until
Bradford, 2 Clark 511; Carpenter v. Camdispute his possession. The donor was eron, 7 Watts 51; Clark v. Clark, 6 W. &
sinkiug to death, and manifested no will to S. 85.
The register's decree cannot be collaterexert control over the vest, the watch or
Lindsey, 118 Pa. 25;
the key. Although it is said, occasionally, ally attacked. Sage v.1 Sup.
149; Holliday
Irwin v. Hauthorn,
that the donee must retain possession un- v. Ward, 19 Pa. 483.
til the donor's death, Hatch v. Atkinson,
BROCK and RHODES J. for defendant.
56 Me. 324, all that is meant is, that the
No intent to change his domicile being
donor should not regain the possession. shown,
the presumption is that it conDepositing the vest on a chair, table, or tinues to be in Perry County and the
bureau, with knowledge that the donor burden is on those who allege a change.
was not in condition to exert a will to re- Nailor v. French, 4 Yeates 241; Price v.
Price, 156 Pa. 617.
possess himself of it, cannot be considered
Until the first letters are revoked or aba loss of possession.
sence ofjurisdiction in the register grantThe conclusion we have come to is, that ing them is shown, the second letters are
void. Ubil v. Miller, 16 Sup. 497; Shoena good donatio causa mortis of the watch
has been shown, but that that of the$1100 berger's Estate, 139 Pa. 132.
was ineffectual, because it does not appear
OPINION OF THE COURT.
that the delivery of the trunk key actually
The defendant, Charlotte James, is
secured to St. John access to the money.
legally bound to pay the debt in question
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.

to the administrator of Francis Adams.
Whether or not the administrator of the
estate of the deceased is Charles Adams,
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depends upon the validity of the letters of
administration granted by the register of
Cumberland county.

Two separate ad-

ministrations have been granted on the
same estate; hence, if the defendant doubts
the validity of the letters granted in Cuniberland county, she has a right to put in
any plea that may be regarded good
against them: 2 Clark 511.
That the defendant would be protected
if she paid the money under compulsion
of the court does not enlarge the rights of
Charles Adams. Whether or not according to the Act March 15, 1832, Cumberland county was the place of decedent's
principal residence, does not help the
plaintiff. Neither is the fact that Francis
Adams died in said county conclusive of
his domicile. To consider these points
would be virtually deciding which
register originally had jurisdiction, and
this we are not called upon to do, as it
would be an inquiry into the decree of
the register of wills by a collateral proceeding. The decree of a register granting letters of administration is a judicial
act and conclusive, unless for want of
jurisdiction apparent on the face of the
record or for fraud until revoked on
appeal.- Holiday v. Ward, 19 Pa. 485;
Irwin v. Hawthorn, 1 Sup. 149; Carpenter
v. Cameron, 7 Watts. 59; Beeber's Appeal,
99 Pa. 601;Loy v. Kennedy, 1 W. & S. 398,
It, too, is settled in repeated decisions that
two separate, primary administrations
can not exist on the same estate, and that
the one first created is valid until reversed
Brubaker's
by competent authority.
Appeal, 98 Pa. 21; Shoenberger's Estate,
139 Pa. 132; Ubil v. Miller, 16 Sup. 497.
In the face of such authority we are not
permitted to recognize Charles Adams as
the lawful administrator of Francis
Adams, although it may appear that the
register of Cumberland county had jurisdiction and not the register of Perry
county. If Charles Adams be aggrieved,
his only remedy is an appeal to the
Orphans' Court. His letters at this time
are void and he has, therefore, no authority
to bring this action. Judgment is accordingly rendered in favor of the defendant,
and against the plaintiff.
HOUSER, J.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.

On Adams' death, the register of Perry

county, thinking him a resident thereof
at the time of his death, issued letters of
administration. The register of Cumberland the next day issued letters to Thomas
Adams,assumingthattbe decedent's domicile was not in Perry but in Cumberland.
The general principle is, that the register
being a judicial officer, his decrees are not
to be collaterally attacked. But unfortunately, a collateral attack on the act of
one of the registers in the case before us is
unavoidable. The law does not recognize
two concurrent administrations, still less
twoadministrationsemanatingfrom different authorities. The claim of the Perry
county administrator to administer would
involvean attack on the Cumberland grant
of letters, no less than would the claim of
the Cumberland administrator an attack
on the Perry letters.
The proper method of avoiding a clashing administration would have been for
the Perry administrator to have askedthe
Cumberland register to revoke his letters,
or to have appealed to the Orphans'
Court of Cumberland to revoke the register's act. Debtors would not be interested
in the respective titles of the administrators, except so far as they might have recognized that of one, in making payments
to him. The mortgagor, James, does not
allege and prove that he has paid the
Perry administrator, and for that reason
ask to be relieved from duty of paying
again. So far as appears he has paid nothing. Morenver, if he should pay a judgment recovered in this case, he might
reasonably invoke a principle that letters
granted are not collaterally impeachable.
Instead, however, of adhering to the
principle that the official act of a register
is exempt from collateral question, an exception to it has been introduced. The
principle, tacitly announced in Ubil v.
Miller, 16 Super. 497 is, that if two or
more registers grant letters of administration, the second and latter grants are ipso
facto void, and that it is open to a debtor,
when sued by an administrator claiming
under a second grant, to show the preceding grant, and so establish, the voidness of the plaintiffs' letters.
The law is then reduced to this interestingform. The register in granting letters,
decides on the existence of the jurisdictional facts; e. g. the residence of the de-
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ceased; or the presence of the property of
the deceased within his county, and the
absence of these facts cannot be shown in
a collateral attack. But, although another
jurisdictional fact is the non-issue of letters
on the same estate by any other register,
the implied or expressed decision of the
register as to the existence of this fact is
not conclusiVe. In a collateral proceeding the non-issue may be denied, and if
the denial is established, the act of the
second register treated as a nullity.
Judgment affirmed.
STRONG vs. SCHOOL DISTRICT.
Contract to teach in public schools for
specifiedperiod-Destructionof building
by fire-Right to recover compensation
for remainderof term.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Miss Strong was elected, by the school
board, in August, 1898, as a teacher in one
of the township schools for the ensuing
school year. Later and before the opening
of the school term she was directed to
teach in a certain school at thirty dollars
per month, the school term was also fixed
at nine months.
She entered upon her duties and taught
six months when the schoolhouse was destroyed by fire. The board failed to secure quarters for the balance of the term.
She made no effort to secure employment
elsewhere, and brings suit at the close of
the term for ninety dollars. She had no
written contract with the board.
MILLER and WATSON for the plaintiff.
The plaintiff was regularly elected, was
ready at all times to carry out her agreement, and is therefore entitled to full compensation. Eisenhower v. School District,
13 Sup. 51; 47 Mich. 112; School District v.
Scott, 46 Vt. 452.
It is the duty of the board to provide
suitable buildings. P. & L. Vol. I 120.
The destruction of the building was no
excuse. "It is not enough that great difficulties are encountered by the directors
in fulfillingtheirpart of agreement. Cashen
v. School District, 50 Vt. 28.
MowRY and WRIGHT for the defendant.
It is to be presumed that both parties
contemplated the continued existence of
the buildings when entering into the contract, therefore, the destruction of the
buildings relieved the directors from duty
of compensating teacher. Wells v. Cole-
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man, 107 Mass. 514; Dexter v. Norton, 47
N. Y. 62.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The facts show that the plaintiff performed the contract on her part without
She kept the
a fault or shortcoming.
school as long as a place was provided in
which to keep it. She was not discharged
from the contract, nor has she repudiated
it in any form. From the fact that she
did not seek other employment we can
infer that she treated the contract as continuing and was ready to perform her
part. "If a person employed for a definite time be discharged before the expiration of the contract, it is not incumbent on him to show that he was ready
and willing to continue the service."
Schaich v. Wannamacher, 5 Atlantic (Pa.)
31. But the school board neglected orwas
unable to provide quarters for the balance
of the term, and thereby prevented performance by plaintiff. Admitting that it
was impossible to secure a suitable building, and yet there is no rule of justice
which will entitle the district to visit its
misfortunes upon the plaintiff. "To
justify the directors in refusing to pay the
salary to the teacher it must appear that
the observance of the contract by the
school district was caused to be iinpossible by act of God. It is not enough
that great difficulties were encountered or
that satisfactory reasons could be given
for closing the schools." Dewey v. Alpena School District, 43 Mich. 482.
In a case similar to this the plaintiff
was hired by the district to serve as a
teacher in one of its schools for ten
months. He taught for a time and then
the directors closed the schools, on account
They
of the prevalence of smallpox.
were then re-opened and the plaintiff resumed his duties. The directors refused
to pay him for the period of suspension,
and he brought suit to recover the salary.
It was decided that the contract was positive and for alawful purpose. On one side,
buildings and pupils were to be provided,
and on the other, personal service as
teacher. The plaintiff continued ready to
perform, but the district refused to open
the schools, and thereby prevented performance by plaintiff. The plaiutiffshould
be allowed to recover salary for the period
during which the schools were closed.
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Dewey v. Alpena School District, Supra.
Although it does not appear that the defendants considered the contract terminated when the building was burned, it
was so insisted by counsel for defendant,
and that the directors cannot be compelled
to provide houses or pay the teacher for
the balance of the term. Although the
defendants treated the contract as ended,
still we must decide that "The plaintiff is
primafacie entitled to the stipulated compensation for the whole term. If so, the
burden of proof in regard to his employment elsewhere, or his ability to obtain
employment must necessariiy rest on the
defendant. All evidence in mitigation is
for defendant to give. In its nature it is
affirmative, and hence it is for him to
prove who asserts it. But the possibility
of obtaining other similar employment, or
the fact that other employment was obtained bears upon the case only in mitigation of damages, and it is therefore part
of defendant's case." King v. Steiren, 44
Pa. 99. Emery v. Steckel, 126 Pa. 171.
"No evidence having been offered the
plaintiff should recover the whole amount
of her stipulated compensation as the
damages attributable to the defendant's
breach of contract. This, as has been seen,
is the true measure of damages." Howard
v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 371.
In view of the cases cited above we give
judgment for plaintiff for $90.
PEIGHTEL, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.

This is an action of assumpsit brought
by the plaintiff to recover her salary as
teacher in the township schools for three
months. The employment of Miss Strong
was regular, and was for the period of
nine months. After the expiration of six
months, the building was destroyed by
fire, and no other building being secured
the school remained closed for the balance
of the year. Though holding herself in
readiness to perform the duties undertaken, yet it does not appear that any effort was made by her to secure other employment. This we do not think was
necessary. "We do not think the plaintiff was bound to lookup any other school,
or endeavor to find other employment,
during the remainder of her term. It was
not her duty tofind work not in her vocation, and it.was outof the season to obtain

a situation as a school teacher." Smith v.
School District No. 2, 69 Mich. 589.
But it is insisted that the defendants
were relieved from the obligation of their
contract by the unforeseen accident which
resulted in the destruction of the building
by fire, and that, therefore, no recovery
can be had. An examination of the adjudicated cases leads us to the conclusion
that this objection is not well taken.
In Corn v. Board Education 39 Ill.
App. 446, the teacher was prevented from
fulfilling his contract by the destruction
of the school house by a tornado. It appeared that other suitable buildings could
not be obtained. In sustaining the right
to a recovery, the court said, "The contract by its terms did not provide that the
school board would be discharged from
compliance with its terms by reason of the
destruction of the school house. The discharge of either party to the contract
would not result as a matter of law, because of the destruction of the building.
Neither would the school board be discharged from liability on their contract
by reason of the destruction of the school
house, and their inability to procure another building. If it had been desired to
discharge either party from the contract
for such cause, the contract should have
so provided."
In School Directors v. Crews, 23I1. App.
367, a recovery was allowed where the
building was destroyed by fire one month
after the term began; in Charlestown
School Township v. Hay, 74 Ind. 127,
where the fire occuired during the term;
and in the following cases where the
building was destroyed by fire, Smith v.
School District No. 2, 69 Mich. 589; Cashen
v. School District No. 12, 50 Vt. 30, and
in Broniley v. School District No. 5, 47
Vt. 381.
But one case to the contrary is to be
found, Hall v. School District No. 10, 24
Mo. App. 213, which has been distinguished by a later decision of the same
court, Rudy v. School District, 30 Mo.
App. 113. It was put on the ground that
the contract was made with reference to
that particular building, and, it being in
the contemplation of the parties that the
school should be kept only in that house,
its destruction by fire discharges the contract. In the case before us, the plaintiff
was employed to teach in the township
schools, and the particular building used,
was afterwards assigned for her use, so
that the reasoning which led to the determination here would not be applicable to
this case.
We are clearly of the opinion that the
lower court was correct in its conclusion,
and the judgment is affirmed.

